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WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH
252 Va. 3, 472 S.E.2d 50 (1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Marlon Dwayne Williams, pleaded guilty to capital murder after a
grand jury indicted him for murder for hire. 1 The indictment charged
Williams with the murder of Helen Bledsoe, wife of the defendant's
partner in a cocaine distribution scheme. According to the stipulated
facts on appeal, Williams broke into the victim's house, shot her twice in
the head and then left the scene. Over a year later, the defendant
confessed to killing Bledsoe for $4,000, in a taped conversation with his
roommate, a police informant.
2
The sentencing report stated that Williams pleaded guilty to the
murder charge because he claimed he was guilty, and did not want to
blame anyone else for the crime. At the sentencing hearing, various
witnesses testified to incidents of misconduct by Williams, including
physical assault, death threats, planning for the commission of other
murders, burglary, malicious wounding, assault during incarceration,
and juvenile crimes. In mitigation, the defense presented evidence of
physical abuse, a turbulent background, frequent moving, and Depart-
ment of Social Services intervention. The trialjudge sentenced Williams
to death after a finding of future dangerousness.
3
HOLDING
After conducting a proportionality review,4 the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the lower court's imposition of the death sentence
based on the finding of future dangerousness was not excessive or
disproportionate to the crime committed and affirmed the conviction and
death sentence.5
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The court's opinion does not discuss what considerations led
Williams to plead guilty to capital murder. While there are rare excep-
tions, itis strongly recommended that no defendantplead guilty to capital
murder absent either an agreement from the Commonwealth not to seek
death or a formal, or strong informal, indication from the trial judge that
the sentence will not be death.
1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(2).
2 Williams v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 3,4-6,472 S.E.2d 50,50-51
(1996).
3 Id. at 4-9,472 S.E.2d at 51-53 (1996).
4 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 requires that the Supreme Court of
Virginia review every death sentence regardless of whether an appeal is
made. The defendant in Williams appealed, but assigned as error only
those matters the court was bound by statute to review in every case. 252
Va. at 5, 472 S.E.2d at 51.
5 Id. at 11, 472 S.E.2d at 54.
6 See, Henderson, Presenting Mitigation Against the Client's
Wishes: a Moral or Professional Imperative, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol 6., No. 1, p. 32 (Fall 1993) (discussing many of the ethical issues
present in the defense of clients in death penalty cases, including those
related to the defense of clients who do not wish to be defended).
7 Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
While a plea is ultimately the client's responsibility, capital defense
attorneys have additional duties when clients are impaired in their
capacities, as is often the situation in capital cases.
6
Guilty pleas eliminate all issues concerning the gathering and
presentation of evidence,jury selection,jury instructions and othertrial-
related errors. Nevertheless, upon entering a guilty plea, the defendant
may appeal errors in the imposition of the sentence. For example,
Williams could have assigned errors about the standard of proof for
unadjudicated acts or the relevance of evidence to "future dangerous-
ness," such as the physical abuse of his girlfriend or crimes allegedly
committed when he was a juvenile. A potential assignment of error
concerning the judge's consideration of mitigation evidence could have
been based onHitchcock v.Dugger,7 in which the United States Supreme
Court held a death sentence was unconstitutional where the trial court in
effect instructed the jury to consider only mitigating factors set out in
state statute. 8 The trial judge in Williams, in contradiction of Hitchcock,
may have thought the defendant's mitigation evidence had to establish a
statutory mitigating factor.9
Proportionality review requires the Supreme Court of Virginia to
consider only "whether the sentence of death 'is excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant."' 10 Unfortunately, reliance on this statutory
review for relief is futile in Virginia. In Williams's case, defense counsel
commendably prepared the record by supplementing it with cases where
the defendant did not receive a death sentence for a comparable crime. II
Although there were eleven murder-for-hire cases in which the defen-
dant did not receive the death penalty, and four where the court imposed
the death penalty, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "'while there
are exceptions, other sentencing bodies in this Commonwealth generally
impose the supreme penalty forcomparable orsimilar offenses.'" 1 2 This
holding suggests the Virginia Supreme court conducts the comparison in
a highly subjective manner. To date, the court has never reversed a
sentence on statutory review.
Summary and Analysis by:
David T. McIndoe
8 Id. at 399.
9 Williams, at 11, 472 S.E.2d at 54, (stating that trial judge had
"taken all of that into consideration" yet could not "see in any way how
[he could] find ... extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time
[Williams] killed the victim in this case"). Extreme emotional or mental
disturbance is a statutory mitigating factor. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.4(B)(ii). Capital sentencers must consider all proffered mitigation
evidence, whether or not it suffices to establish or is even related to a
statutory factor. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982).
10 Va. Code Ann. § 17-100.1(C)(2).
11 For further discussion of this issue, see case summary of Roach
v. Commonwealth in Capital Defense Journal, Vol 8, No. 2, p. 11 (1996).
12 252 Va. at 10-11,472 S.E.2d at 54 (quoting Roach v. Common-
wealth, 244 Va. 455,468,468 S.E.2d 98, 114 (1996)).
